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## Weber before Weberian sociology\*

### ABSTRACT

Max Weber's reputation is based almost exclusively on the methodological writings and substantive sociology published after the essay on 'Objectivity' (1904) and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-5). But Weber had in fact published theoretically significant work on capitalist development, agrarian social relations, and antiquity in the decade of the 1890s. This paper investigates these 'early writings' as a basis for Weber's later sociology. Placing Weber in an intellectual and political context, the paper sets forth an interpretation of the distinctive characteristics of his structural analysis of society and his understanding of history. It also considers the innovations in Weber's conceptual language, particularly his use of the concept '*Arbeitsverfassung*', and in his early relationship to Marx and Nietzsche. The discussion defends the view that there is a distinctively Weberian 'structuralism' and 'developmental history', setting Weber apart in important ways from Marx and Nietzsche.

From its earliest reception Max Weber's work has been closely associated with the idea of a *verstehende* sociology that defines its subject matter as 'social action' and its methodology as the postulate of the 'subjective interpretation of action'. But in a recent study Bryan Turner has sought to undermine this received view, arguing for a fundamental incompatibility between Weber's 'substantive studies' and his 'methodological principles', an incompatibility revealed by the way in which those studies 'adhere far more closely to a Marxist structuralism than they do to *verstehen* principles'.<sup>1</sup> The intention behind Turner's invention of a 'structuralist' Weber is to show, first, that 'meaningful social action' for Weber is always subjected to 'structural' or 'objective' constraints; second, that Weber's sociology shares with Marxism a 'deterministic perspective' having an internal logic independent of individual consciousness; and third, that *this*

sociology is philosophically — ontologically and epistemologically — ‘autonomous’. Such Weberian revisionism may be new, contentious, or both. It is important in any case as part of the struggle for the mastery of Weber, a struggle that is important since Weber is thought to occupy a central terrain in the social sciences. Whoever controls the interpretation of Weber can entertain hopes of also governing scientific activity.

It must be said, however, that Turner’s argument puts us on precisely the wrong ground. We are compelled to choose between two allegedly divergent strains in Weber’s thought, strains that Weber himself somehow failed to conceptualize in terms adequate to our present understanding. The basis of the choice is uncertain: is it textual, theoretical, polemical or political? In addition, the choice is not attuned to the dynamics of Weber’s entire sociology, but to Turner’s partial instrumentation of its modes, splitting Weber’s voice into two dissonant lines, pitting Weber against Weber. To choose *for* Weber is also to choose *against* him; to accept a ‘structuralist’ Weber is to reject the sociology that typically bears his name. The paradox will merely mislead instead of yielding a more fruitful orientation. The question to ask is not, which is the true Weber, but rather, what assumptions must be present in order for this kind of choice to be possible at all?

For Turner two assumptions are essential: first, what Weber really means can be separated from and substituted for what he only says. In Turner’s words, ‘Weber did not adhere to his own interpretative principles’.<sup>2</sup> Second, genuine meaning can then be extracted by squeezing Weber’s thought into pre-formed categories of the interpreter’s own making. Thus, Weber can be imagined to play ‘the Jeremiah of modern capitalism’<sup>3</sup> — in conjunction, one supposes, with Marx’s Isaiah. Unfortunately, both assumptions must be rejected. Nevertheless, I do not wish to take away everything from Turner’s efforts, for there is a serious problem concealed in his approach. The problem can be restated in the following way. There are two analytically distinguishable tendencies in Weber’s substantive thought: one in which status groups, social classes, patterns of domination, and material interests define the analytic core; and a second in which religious ethics, normative orders, patterns of legitimation, and ideal interests define a rather different set of core notions. This distinction is present *within* the substantive sociology itself, not between that sociology and any set of methodological principles. It has to do with the very content of Weber’s work, not with oppositions between substance and form, rhetoric and meaning, structuralism and subjectivism, materialism and idealism. The problem is not to find a point of leverage from which Weber can be catapulted either closer to ‘Marxist structuralism’ or farther away from it, but rather to discover what the relationship is between these two tendencies in

Weber's thought, why that relationship is important, and what consequences it can have for social theory.

This is the first of my themes. In developing it I want to suggest that there is a distinctively Weberian 'structuralism' which can be established well before Weber's methodological reflections, that Weber's mode of analysis employs a special conceptual terminology, and that any alleged 'determinism' in Weber's thought needs to be reformulated in terms of a 'developmental history' which assumes 'reciprocal causality' and a plurality of institutionalized spheres of action. Far from establishing the 'autonomy' of sociology, Weber's approach seems to be self-consciously embedded within a set of assumptions about the nature of history, society, and human understanding. In order to recover these points I propose to place Weber in his intellectual milieu and to look closely at what he actually says and why he says it.

I also want to suggest as a secondary theme that Weber's approach was intended in large part to counter the achievements of two predecessors: Marx and Nietzsche. Weber himself raises the possibility of such a view, remarking in 1920 that a scholar's integrity can be judged

according to how he takes a stand in relation to Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever denies that he could not have accomplished the most important parts of his own work without the work done by both of them deceives himself and others. The world in which we live as intellectual beings is largely a world bearing the imprint of Marx and Nietzsche.<sup>4</sup>

The 'philosopher of history' against whom these remarks were directed, Oswald Spengler, had failed the test by claiming to 'refute' Nietzsche's philosophy and Marx's historical predictions through a stylish and misguided 'academic prophecy' of his own. Weber could not restrain his scorn: confronted with such alternatives, he retorted, our allegiance should be commanded not by someone like Spengler, but by his opponents. As for Marx,

Should he arise from his grave today and look around, despite several important deviations working against his prophecies, he would have every reason to say, truly this is flesh of my flesh and bone of my bones.<sup>5</sup>

The same could have been said for Nietzsche.

The story may be apocryphal, but it is certainly allegorical: as a reflection on modernity, a claim that we moderns live in a post-Marxian and post-Nietzschean world, it can become a parable of Weber's own intellectual genesis. The brief confrontation with the philosophy of history succeeds in illuminating an essential part of the

substructure of Weber's thought, without which his contributions would not have been possible at all. Omissions are important in these self-reflections: Kant and Hegel remain in the shadows. There appears to be a special connection to Marx and Nietzsche, for it is only with them that we move to the center of Weber's world, a world presupposed at the beginning of his intellectual journey. I want to ask what Weber could have owed to an encounter with *both* of these antagonistic spirits, to the master of dialectic *and* the dialectician of mastery.

The two themes I am proposing to consider appear at the foundations, so to speak, 'before' Weberian sociology. They suggest the problem in the Weberian terminology, derived from Kant and Nietzsche's critique of the Kantian philosophy, of a science 'with presuppositions' – historical and philosophical, practical and theoretical.<sup>6</sup> I mean to invoke this language in a double sense: logically and textually my themes precede the work for which Weber has become famous. Weber's sociology of legitimate domination and sociology of religion, for example, can be seen as responses to the crisis of western thought occasioned by Marx's critique of capitalist production and Nietzsche's critique of the philosophical foundations of knowledge. Political-ethical correlates can be found for both critiques: revolution and nihilism. Weber's self-defined vocation, we might say, was to see whether any meaning at all could be wrested from the post-critical, disenchanted world, the 'age of subjectivist culture'.<sup>7</sup> I propose to consider this project in relation to the work before *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–5), for I think the essential design of it is to be seen there. The later texts are a reflection of the formative ideas, according to the view taken here. Thus, what I shall say is less about any aspects of Weber's later substantive sociology than about the groundwork of that sociology, the preparation for it. I intend in this way to push Weber's analysis back to its practical and theoretical sources, to judge its breadth and depth, not by neatly separating the 'history' from the 'systematics' of theory, but by seeing how the one can instruct the other.

Is it possible, then, that when brought before the bar of judgment Weber may appear to stand in a different relation to Weberian sociology than we have come to expect?

# I

Max Weber's intellectual and political environment was dominated by four critical issues: the end of liberalism, the growth of socialism, the spread of economic perspectives in the social sciences, and the propagation of cultural pessimism. It was above all these issues, both historical and theoretical, that shaped his thinking from beginning to

end. One might say that they provided the framework within which his scientific contribution evolved.

The theme of liberalism's demise has several dimensions to it, many of which are political and specific to the German situation after 1878: the alliance between industrial capital and semi-feudal agrarian interests, the impotence of the old middle class liberal parties, and the authoritarian 'revolution from above' in social policy. But the more fundamental shift occurred in thought as a movement not so much from history to sociology, as Antoni would have it,<sup>8</sup> as from the liberal historiography of a Ranke or Roscher to the political economy of figures like Rodbertus, Bücher and Knapp. This meant a rather startling shift in the most fundamental categories of analysis: from *Rechtstaat* to *Machtstaat*, from Manchesterism to *Volkswirtschaft*, from a concern with civilizational progress to a critique of developmental sequences. Weber had started at the liberal end of this continuum, as a student of Roscher and careful applicant of historical method, but through the 1880s and 1890s his imagination was attracted to the newer modes of post-liberal, economic thought. The tasks in politics and science were different now, 'not to be understood with the means of our science', he once complained as a Berlin doctoral candidate, and they therefore called for different modes of analysis and different analytic vocabularies.<sup>9</sup>

The obverse and complementary theme was in many ways the growth of socialism as a political movement, a cultural doctrine and belief system, and a system of thought claiming scientific status. Weber's acute awareness of these factors cannot be exaggerated. Stated in rather schematic terms, this can be demonstrated in two spheres: Weber's political and scholarly involvements with Naumann's Protestant reform movement (the *Evangelisch-soziale Kongress*) and with the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in the 1890s, and his stance with respect to the reception of Marx's work during the same decade. In the case of the Protestant movement, it was clear from the start that Naumann conceived his agitation as an alternative to organized socialism, as a haven for social reform on the Left, and as a force for overcoming divisions between middle and working classes.<sup>10</sup> Activist members like Weber and his friend Paul Göhre (who later joined the SPD) — 'radicals' as they were called — typified the combative reformist stance, at least prior to 1897.<sup>11</sup> As for the *Verein*, its research projects and debates through the 1890s, including Weber's own work on agrarian relations in East Elbia, were also typically motivated by a concern with socialism and general questions of 'social policy'. In fact the *Verein*'s activities were largely defined by 'conservative' academic socialists (*Kathedersozialisten*) favoring a kind of state-sponsored 'socialism from above', but the Association was still sufficiently eclectic to include Socialist Party members like Max Quarck and Bruno Schönlink, as well as a number of nonconformists like

Lujo Brentano and Weber. As would be expected, the *Verein* became the leading forum for wide-ranging political and social-scientific controversy.

A simultaneous reception of Marx occurred in two phases: In 1891 at the Erfurt Congress German socialism abandoned the moderating emphases of the Gotha Program (1875) in favor of Marx's critique and revolutionary ideology. And in 1894, with publication of volume three of *Capital*, Marx's thought began to penetrate academic circles and scientific discourse. The historical connections here to Weber are complex, as Roth has shown,<sup>12</sup> but they can be summarized in the following way: Weber had numerous opportunities to know about practical developments in Socialist Party politics, and there is every indication that he followed these developments closely.<sup>13</sup> In addition, according to Sombart, whose association with Weber dates from the 1890s, Marx was really 'discovered' as a theorist when *Capital III* became available.<sup>14</sup> Weber participated in this discovery: for instance, when compiling the reading bibliography for his Heidelberg seminar of 1898, he included not only the works of Bernstein, Engels, Kautsky, Lassalle, Proudhon and other socialists, but also the three volumes of *Capital*.<sup>15</sup> In other words, considerable evidence supports the conclusion that Weber's knowledge of Marx and his quarrel with Marxist socialism's claims as a science found its first expression in the studies written from 1894 to 1898, roughly from the 'Developmental Tendencies' essay to the second version of '*Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum*'.

The third critical issue — the growing attraction of economic categories and explanations in the social sciences — follows from the first two. Here it was a matter of the convergence of a number of lines of thought, not only Marxism, around a single insight. According to Weber's observations,

We find the economic mode of thought advancing in all spheres: social policy [Sozialpolitik] in place of politics, economic power-relations in place of legal relations, cultural and economic history in place of political history. . . .<sup>16</sup>

But while the new orientation represented an advance in the sciences, it also suggested a danger: the 'economic point of view' was capable of 'overestimating' the significance of its achievements, Weber argued, by postulating an autonomous, self-evident sphere of economic 'ideals' according to which policy could be judged and corrected. This could be seen as the familiar Platonic ambition to secure the foundations of knowledge, only now separated from philosophy and reinstated in the socio-cultural sciences. Like the earlier attempt in philosophy, as Nietzsche had shown, the newer variant would run headlong into 'a chaos of value-standards' that

could not be organized using its own tools, the tools of economic analysis.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, to mention Nietzsche is to remind ourselves of the undercurrent of 'cultural pessimism' that gained force through the 1890s, a force that was surely strong enough to capture Weber's attention. Unfortunately, the probable connections between Weber and the reception of Nietzsche have remained quite obscure; there is still no adequate account of the important historical relationships.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, one can briefly suggest that the effects of Nietzsche's work would have been felt by Weber in two spheres: the *Evangelisch-soziale Kongress* and the university community. The 'cult of Nietzsche', as Tönnies called it, became a controversial topic for the Congress after 1892, the year in which Weber became active in its forums and publications. It was primarily Nietzsche as 'moralist', as 'the Copernicus of the moral world' in the words of one reviewer, that sparked this critical debate.<sup>19</sup> In academia, on the other hand, the critical response took different forms: Alois Riehl, Weber's Freiburg colleague, claimed Nietzsche's 'aristocratic radicalism' for the canon of philosophical reflection, while in sociology Tönnies, an early devotee, now turned against the 'aristocratic and androcratic' social implications of the Nietzsche legacy.<sup>20</sup> Given Weber's well-known passion for public and cultural affairs, it is certainly no exaggeration to see the burgeoning Nietzsche-movement and the critical responses provoked by it as an important part of his intellectual horizon.

Of course, indirect evidence of this kind cannot be construed to mean that Weber adopted Nietzschean philosophy, any more than he accepted Marxist theory. On the contrary, unlike Tönnies or Simmel, his writing did not traverse the Nietzschean terrain. But one can say, nevertheless, that Nietzsche's arrival as a serious critic brought before Weber the problematic character of the meaning of culture and the moral ideals by which a particular culture is justified. If Weber's early attacks on a 'eudaemonian' ethics and politics could appear 'Nietzschean', it was not so much because of a direct borrowing of substantive ideas, but rather because of a similarity in the form of his questioning.

## II

How did Weber respond to these four issues? What path did his thought follow as he worked through the configuration of problems confronting the political and scientific communities? What were the original elements in his theoretical contribution? The answers must be sought, I think, in what might be called Weber's first analysis of capitalist development and in his writings on antiquity. There was in fact a close relationship between the two, for both contained an

analysis of the conditions and origins of capitalism and an analysis of the 'developmental history' of social and economic forms in the west.<sup>21</sup> The discussion was initiated with the two 'dissertations' (1889, 1891) and it ended with the work on agrarian sociology in 1897-8.

The important starting points for Weber's early work on capitalism can be found in two places: the studies of G. F. Knapp, the doyen of agrarian economists and the authority on East Elbia prior to Weber's studies; and the evolutionary schema of theorists like Rodbertus and Bücher, who had aimed for sweeping reconceptualizations of history in terms of material production.

Knapp was important because he had asked Marx's old question about the essential characteristics of capitalism, but then instead of pursuing a formalistic analysis of economic 'laws' had sought an answer in historical relations. The answer to the question, according to this view, could best be grasped when one asked, when and where did capitalism *begin*? Knapp's thesis (which has been popularized once again) placed those origins in sixteenth-century agriculture, especially the *Gutswirtschaft* of East Germany, where one could observe production for a market and accumulation of profits by an entrepreneurial class, both necessary conditions for capitalist development, whether agrarian or industrial.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, Rodbertus and later Bücher had attempted to address the problem of evolutionary stages and sequences, a problem that had also taken shape in Marx's writings, and one that was acknowledged and emphasized in Weber's own time by Engels. We know from Weber's early reading and correspondence with Brentano that he was familiar with Engels's 1884 study, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, and that he credited Rodbertus' reconstruction of 'oikos economy' as a type of productive system with stimulating his own work on antiquity.<sup>23</sup> The same can be said for Weber's interpretation of Bücher's three-fold typology — household economy, city economy, and national economy [*Volkswirtschaft*] — and its evolutionary historical application, a terminology that Weber also borrowed and regarded as a fruitful starting point, even though it was eventually criticized, altered and discarded.

What Weber retained from these beginnings is a complex matter. In his early work on the East Elbian territories, for instance, he largely accepted Knapp's views about the sixteenth-century transformation and the basic characteristics of capitalist production, but he also sought to reconceptualize the problem of capitalism's development in terms that would make sense out of the economic *and* political demise of the traditional patriarchal system of domination in the East. In order to accomplish this project Weber had to look more closely than did Knapp and others at the systematic relationships connecting the system of economic production, social stratification

and political power. Also, Weber came to reject any ordering of these relations in a mechanistic or dialectical 'stage theory', whether espoused by Rodbertus, Bücher, Marx, or Engels. The questions raised in these controversies were partly historical, partly theoretical. Thus, Weber rejected Rodbertus' thesis of the 'autarchy of the oikos' on historical grounds, as Eduard Meyer acknowledged,<sup>24</sup> but he also reworked the entire idea of a necessary progression through step-like stages, an evolutionary theory, while retaining the developmental perspective in historical studies through elaboration of type concepts. The shift from 'real' historical stages (i.e., thought to be real), as found in Bücher and Engels, to hypothetical and heuristic types was Weber's solution *in nuce* to the theoretical dilemma presented by a naive superimposition of historical and conceptual forms.

It is in light of these starting points that we should understand Weber's self-proclaimed reputation as the younger generation's 'enfant terrible'.<sup>25</sup> The epithet is thought usually to derive from Weber's sharp and unconventional practical-political views, but there is in fact a significant theoretical-scientific source for it as well. Knapp himself recognized the extent of Weber's innovations at an early stage: commenting on Weber's lengthy study for the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, Knapp declared that 'this work above all has led to the perception that our expertise has been surpassed, that we must start to learn all over again'.<sup>26</sup> The factual details amassed by Weber in his systematic analysis of the *Verein's* questionnaires would not have surprised Knapp, for such facts were well-known to those who had studied the problem, but the interpretive perspective according to which Weber ordered his observations would have provoked surprise and controversy. Indeed, it continued to provoke controversy; as Weber said of the polemical Freiburg Inaugural Address three years later, 'not agreement, but opposition' encouraged the resolve to publish his views.<sup>27</sup> The 'oppositional' element was also remarkably evident in most of his scientific work during these years and stimulated the controversial response to its publication.

Knapp's unusually generous praise can be attributed specifically to two novel aspects of Weber's theoretical contributions: first, formation of a new analytical language which recombined elements from diverse sources in the historical school, classical and Marxist political economy, and political sociology; and second, the attempt to conceptualize a 'developmental history' (to use the terminology employed by Roth and Schluchter),<sup>28</sup> starting with nineteenth-century Germany, but in the end including all of antiquity. Finally, Weber's 'developmentalism' (in contrast to Marx's evolutionism) also led to a frank assessment of political ends and the limits of science, combined with what might be termed a 'pessimistic' appraisal of the course of history. Each of these innovations invites close consideration.

## III

The analytic language Weber employs in his early studies contains some intriguing and problematic features. Turning to the 1892 text to which Knapp referred, one finds Weber opening the study with a statement about the problem of 'social class formation', class conflict, and competing 'material interests'.<sup>29</sup> The introductory chapter is a sophisticated class analysis of the agrarian social structure of the eastern territories, one that exposes the morphology of relations (*Verhältnisse*) and oppositions (*Gegensätze*) among the economically and politically relevant strata. The emphasis is upon relationships, conflicts and dynamic processes. The concepts Weber uses might therefore be designated 'relational', for they either connect one social unit with another or refer to patterned social interactions. This level of language is then continued and augmented through subsequent texts: we hear of labor-power and capital, production and exchange, material interests and ideal interests, division of labour and relations of domination. The terminology of superstructure (*Ueberbau*) and base (*Unterbau, Basis*) also makes an appearance, although always in a critical context.

Of course it is this kind of conceptual terminology that has led some writers to see the not-so-invisible hand of Marx in Weber's earliest studies. Thus, Löwith has suggested that some evidence points toward Weber's predilection for 'a free application of the method of historical materialism' taking 'the contradiction between relations of production and forces of production as a guide for explanation'.<sup>30</sup> Or Fleischmann even goes so far as to say (although Löwith refrains from doing so) that Weber grasped for Marx's guidance early, '“verifying” the correctness of the Marxist theory', only to turn away from it later, presumably under Nietzsche's aegis.<sup>31</sup> However, Weber was emphatically not Sombart, the 'proteus of German social scientists', who as a young socialist and scholar received Engels' grudging praise as a 'somewhat eclectic Marxist'.<sup>32</sup> Unlike some of his contemporaries, Weber was not weaned on the Marxist dialectic.

We see the distance between Weber and the Marxism of his day most clearly by raising two questions: (1) Is there a central concept, nodal point or idea — such as 'equality' in Tocqueville, 'alienation' in Marx, 'anomie' in Durkheim, the 'unconscious' in Freud — around which Weber's thought develops? Is there anything in Weber's early writing that would qualify as a conceptual breakthrough? (2) What is Weber's understanding of social and historical explanation? Can it be said that he accepts the basic form of 'Marxist structuralism' (to use Turner's phrase) and works within the limits of its assumptions?

The first question appears more difficult to answer for Weber than for other major nineteenth-century social theorists. Concepts like rationalization, bureaucratization and domination come to mind.

However, none of these are satisfactory as starting points, even though all become prominent after 1905. Instead, another concept seems an attractive candidate: *Arbeitsverfassung*, the key theoretical term in Weber's major writings from 1892 to 1894. This term, which resists precise translation, was common among political economists, Weber included, as a shorthand way of characterizing the historically-given 'constitution', 'condition' or 'organization' of labour, or labour-relations.<sup>33</sup> It was not a purely formal category like those used in classical economics and for this reason found favor in the 'historical school'. In its most general usage the concept was unusual because of a double origin and meaning. Combining both social and juridical connotations, political-economic and Aristotelian languages, it could refer to 'environmental' conditions (including legal norms) acting on the individual conceived as a 'unit of labour' and to the 'material' and 'mental' state of labour in the abstract. Thus, one could speak of 'labour' as both concrete activity and abstract potential, and of the 'constitution of labour' as a summation of a given configuration of material conditions, social structure, legal principles, and even psychological or ethical motivations.

Weber did employ the concept in this general sense, but he also modified the standard connotation in two important ways. First, he sought to give '*Arbeitsverfassung*' a particular meaning that would render it useful for causal explanations. This required postulating a distinction among different kinds of explanatory factors: for example, in the East Elbia studies labor's situation was said to be 'determined' variously by economic forces, such as the 'mode of enterprise' (*Betriebsweise*); by political considerations, such as the workers' 'desire for freedom', an 'ideal interest' that was quite 'irrational' from a 'materialist' standpoint, as Weber remarked; and by the existing system of social stratification. Weber's most novel suggestion was then to identify the *Arbeitsverfassung* specifically with 'relations' of social stratification within the larger socio-economic system, as appears repeatedly in passages in which he weighs the significance of multiple causal factors:

Thus, for the factors discussed so far — size of the enterprise [Betriebsgrösse] are intensity of cultivation [Wirtschaftsintensität] — we found that in their significance for the workers' situation they were less influential than the inherited *Arbeitsverfassung* (which at the same time includes the social stratification of all the inhabitants of the large estates, or rather is identical to it) and less influential than the traditional living standard of the workers, which is based upon this *Arbeitsverfassung*.<sup>34</sup>

For, as we see again and again, it is the *kind of Arbeitsverfassung*, therefore the kind of social stratification and grouping of the rural

workers, that is decisive for the workers' material situation, and if it further appears that with current power-relations [*Machtverhältnisse*] in rural areas the monetary reorganization of the *Arbeitsverfassung* seriously endangers the workers' material situation, then a change in the mode of enterprise [*Betriebsweise*] (which has the tendency to bring about this monetary reorganization) carries the same dangers within itself. Indeed this is the case with the intensive mode of enterprise.<sup>35</sup>

These are difficult passages, part of an argument in which Weber attempts convincingly to demonstrate the relative explanatory autonomy of the *Arbeitsverfassung*, now sociologically defined, in relation to economic factors (e.g., *Betriebsgrösse*, *Betriebsweise*) and political factors (e.g., *Machtverhältnisse*) in determining the contemporary 'material situation' of agrarian labour. Briefly his argument seeks to show that none of the economic variables can in themselves account for workers' material situation; the *Arbeitsverfassung* (i.e., system of social stratification) and its 'developmental tendencies' must always be included as an 'independent variable', a viewpoint lost on even some of Weber's most knowledgeable colleagues.<sup>36</sup>

The second innovative modification appears at this point as well, for clearly Weber proposed that the *Arbeitsverfassung* be viewed as a 'type', that is, a logically coherent statement of the characteristic properties of a particular social stratification system. Underlying Weber's argumentation is a fundamental opposition between 'patriarchal' and 'capitalist' types of *Arbeitsverfassung*, the former characterized by numerous strata of dependent labour, the latter by 'proletarianization' of agrarian labour and polarization of class conflict. Methodologically, such 'real' consequences of capitalist 'rationalization' can be clarified, Weber argues, only on the basis of a specification and comparison of heuristic types. In fact, the later methodological commentary on types is a reflection on Weber's early practice, not the reverse. Substantively, the historic shift from patriarchal to capitalist types, an inevitable process of change is responsible for restructuring the stratification system, generating for instance a new stratum of migrant laborer who is 'torn out of the collective unity of his family and familiar surroundings and is *only* labour-power for the owner as well as in his own eyes'.<sup>37</sup> The status of the formally free laborer, emancipated from dependencies, contains a deep paradox: for him 'homelessness and freedom are one and the same'.<sup>38</sup>

Weber's critique of agrarian labour's 'exploitation', a term appearing only occasionally,<sup>39</sup> or (as he preferred to say) 'material situation', can remind us of Marx's early discussions of 'alienated labor' or Tocqueville's disturbing passages on the degradation of workers under conditions of an increasingly rationalized division of labor.<sup>40</sup> But for Weber it is a case of the old struggle for 'emancipation of labour

from property', first acted out in antiquity and repeating itself in new circumstances.<sup>41</sup> From Weber's perspective there are no philosophical forms for describing the constitution and reconstitution of labour in the course of these struggles, but rather sociological and logical 'types' that characterize entire systems of stratification (and production). Unlike Marx's view, there is no ontology or teleology of labour in this analysis, only a sociology, a 'developmental history'. Weber does not defend a standpoint from which to condemn the separation between social forms and authentic human nature. In his critical view, one that emerges in Nietzsche's writings as well, the latter can never be more than a philosophical fiction.

Here, then, is a Weberian structuralism. It is a kind of 'structuralism' because Weber conceives of action as partially a result of material (economic) forces external to the individual, and it is Weberian because it refuses to concede a monopoly either to economic rationality or to what one might call foundational ontology. Be this as it may, one still wonders whether it is possible to be more specific about Weber's causal model. Does Weber work within the boundaries of a world conceived as forces of production, relations of production, and superstructure; or does he propose modifications in the 'materialist' terminology?

The language Weber employs suggests a fundamental modification. For one thing, he avoids the requisite terminology of forces and relations of production (*Produktivkräfte, Produktionsverhältnisse*); his early analysis of capitalism is centered much more on labor, interest, and social structure or stratification (*soziale Struktur, soziale Schichtung*). Moreover, when he speaks directly to the issue, he advocates what can be designated 'reciprocal causality'. One representative passage, again summarizing results from the East Elbia research, bears quoting in full:

The causal relationship is at least partially reversed here. With our modern scientific method we have become used to viewing technical-economic conditions [Bedingungen] and interests [Interessen] basically as primary, from which a people's social structure and political formation [Gestaltung] are derived . . . but here we see quite clearly that it is a matter of reciprocal effects in which the purely economic factor does not by any means play the leading role. Population distribution, division of trades, division of land, the legal forms of the organization of labor [Arbeitsverfassung] within individual districts have a much more decisive significance for the material and social-ethical condition of the agricultural worker, for his total standard of living, than do possible differences between favourable or unfavourable economic conditions for agricultural enterprise in certain areas, or than the relationship of profits from one form of production to profits from another form.

It is those relations of social stratification [soziale Schichtungsverhältnisse] which almost entirely determine the workers' standard of living, and as a result of this standard of living — not the reverse — almost entirely determine their wages, their total economic condition.<sup>42</sup>

Once again the relations of social stratification, the *Arbeitsverfassung* in its particular sense, receive primary emphasis and reveal Weber's reliance upon sociological categories. In addition, by speaking of 'reversal' and 'reciprocity' Weber signals the revision of a dominant causal model; yet his alternative is far from self-evident.

The surface clarity of Weber's undogmatic understanding of 'cause' and 'effect' in the above passage masks a complex line of reasoning, beginning with an apparently commonplace distinction between 'technical-economic conditions and interests' on the one side, and 'social structure and political organization' on the other, the former viewed as 'primary' by Marxist science, the latter as epiphenomenal. Such a separation of causal factors implies that for Weber, as for G. A. Cohen and William Shaw recently, Marx was a determinist in the strong sense: that is, 'productive forces' (technological, economic) were taken to be 'the determining factor in historical development'.<sup>43</sup> But for his own purposes Weber deliberately separates 'social stratification' as relations (*Schichtungsverhältnisse*) from the productive 'base' of society and ascribes independent causal significance to such *social* relations. Thus, in this revised model there are three kinds of relations — economic, social and political — and Weber is free to use each as independent causal agents. It must be stressed that 'relations of production' in Marx are redefined as 'relations of social stratification' by Weber; in other words, economic content as 'production' is excluded from the conceptualization of the social sphere.

In addition, we must see that Weber abandons the idea of a level-structure causal model, ordered from the foundation upward, in favor of what should be understood as a network model of causality. Put another way, the hierarchical metaphor dominating Marx's writing is replaced by a cyclical one. The network or cycle imagery contains the symbolization that permits Weber later on to speak of 'causal chains' or to deride the 'theorists of the super-structure' for their belief in an 'ultimate' or 'essential' cause in which a secular theory of history can be grounded.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, it will not prove adequate (and not only because of Hegelian innuendoes) to suppose that Weber wanted either to join with Marx in standing right side up, or to change the intellectual environment by having Marx's followers learn the mysteries of Althusserian consciousness-raising. Weber attempted rather to alter the terms of discourse, not simply by reconstructing 'Marx's shattered system' (as he called it) from its original pieces, but by substituting new conceptual blocks of his own.<sup>45</sup>

## IV

Returning to G. F. Knapp's assessment, let us consider the second dimension of Weber's theoretical contribution: the conception of 'developmental history'. Building on the preceding discussion, it is important to acknowledge that Weber proposed the use of types not only as a way of settling the *Methodenstreit* between 'historical' and 'theoretical' economics, but also as a strategy for fighting clear of the Hegelian legacy (inherited by Marx) of an objectivist philosophy of history with its assumption of necessary, law-like progression through universal stages. Weber seemed to have this in mind when he once remarked, 'There are only two ways: Hegel's or our own approach.'<sup>46</sup> As is well-known, he also thought clarity could be brought to the interpretation of Marx's historical generalizations if his concepts and 'developmental laws' were treated as contingent 'tendencies' and 'ideal types' rather than as 'necessary' and 'real' entities. Consequently, when employing the language of development, Weber spoke of 'developmental tendencies' and of 'developmental stages' or 'phases' (*Entwicklungsstufe*, *Entwicklungsstadium*) merely as hypothetical, heuristic constructions useful for understanding processes of historical change.

There is ample evidence for Weber's strategy in texts leading to the 'Agrarverhältnisse' essay of 1898, not only in his application of the 'Arbeitsverfassung', but also in a general typology of agrarian economies throughout history; in a scheme for clarifying types of agrarian relations west of the Elbe, ranging from small-holdings in the south-west to large peasant enterprises in the north-west; and in a set of analytic types like *oikos* and *polis*, city economy and market economy in the writings on antiquity.<sup>47</sup> What is most interesting about these various, overlapping schemes is not their systematic logical coherence — they remain suggestive only — but the connection they reveal in Weber's mind between antiquity and modernity. It turns out that a single question orders the diversity in Weber's earliest version of developmental history: how have societies organized labour-intensive agricultural production, especially in the face of inevitable seasonal fluctuations in labour requirements? Weber's types, composing a kind of 'genealogy of labour', can be seen as containing possible and actual answers to this central question. But there was a further important question: antiquity entered Weber's field of vision because, like East Elbia in the nineteenth century, it also raised questions about the transformation of agrarian economies under conditions of mixed socio-economic and political forms, sharing features of dependent-feudal relations and capitalist appropriation. Yet outcomes were radically different in the two historical cases. To ask why this was so was to push the analysis beyond a *histoire événementielle* to the higher plane of theoretical conceptualization.

Now Weber was careful to deny any direct lessons from the study of history, either for comforting theories of progress or for strategies of political action. In his words, a study of antiquity could be expected to have only 'historical interest', for

a modern proletarian and a Roman slave would be as unable to understand one another as a European and a Chinese. Our problems are of a completely different character.<sup>48</sup>

It can hardly be accidental that in this same introductory passage from 'The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization' Weber reproduces Marx's epigram from the first German Preface to *Capital I* – 'This story is about you' (*de te narratur fabula*) – in an identical context, but with a precisely opposed meaning.<sup>49</sup> For Weber history issues a harder lesson: it is never simply a story about ourselves, but rather a record of differences, contingencies, unanticipated consequences and paradoxical meanings. The rhetoric of difference can function to create a necessary distance between past and present, antiquity and modernity, text and audience, Marx and Weber himself – distance that is necessary as a precondition for judgments of meaning.

Yet the exercise of judgment raises the possibility of exploring certain suggestive historical analogies. As Weber notes, to study ancient civilization is to observe a process of 'internal self-dissolution' (*innere Selbstauflösung*), and to study the patriarchal system in nineteenth-century Germany is to observe a repetition of that process. Weber says as much at the very end of the East Elbia report, '... now we stand once again before the old problem', namely, the 'emancipation of the lowest stratum of the old society' and the consequences of that emancipation. In Greek and Roman antiquity the struggle for emancipation took the form of a clash between slave and market economies, unfree and free labor. Ancient civilization experienced a nascent 'agrarian capitalism', an 'exchange economy', even what Weber calls a '*grossbürgerliche Politik*' combining commercial and landed interests, but the ancient *polis* remained a center of consumption, not production, and it was eventually subordinated to the 'base of an economy without exchange'. In the case of Rome, Weber contends, the *polis* even finally transformed itself into 'an enormous *oikos*'. This transformation marked a victory of economic over political forces, a victory that would spell the end of the civilization of antiquity and the gradual emergence of conditions that Weber foresaw as 'a new basis for agrarian society'.<sup>50</sup>

What I am suggesting, therefore, is that in this part of his work, particularly the first versions of the *Agrarian Sociology*, Weber's theme is defined by the double interplay between *polis* and *oikos* in antiquity, polity and economy in the modern age. In both Greek and Roman antiquity the theme is emphasized by an argument that

is designed to document the way in which the *oikos* came to obscure and replace the *polis* in the west, and with ambivalent consequences for ancient civilization: on the one hand a decline into feudalism, on the other the restoration of the family as a viable social and productive unit.<sup>51</sup> At the end of this historical process stands the patriarchal 'organization of labour' with its forms of socio-economic dependency and political domination, confronted once again by the corrosive, yet revolutionizing forces of capitalist production and exchange, the 'most fateful force in our modern life'.<sup>52</sup> In the modern age of western civilization the question then became, could it be possible to say along which developmental path the clash of dynamic forces would move modern society?

As a philosophical aside, one might add that this last way of posing the 'developmental' problem for Weber finds a parallel in Nietzsche's short essay, 'The Use and Abuse of History', at the end of which a rationale emerges for Nietzsche's own speculations on antiquity. Like Weber, he understands the Greeks' cultural achievements as presupposing a reinterpretation of 'history'. The Greeks too, Nietzsche writes, were in 'danger of being overwhelmed by what was past and foreign, and perishing on the rock of "history"'. But they 'gradually learned to organize the chaos by . . . thinking back to themselves, to their own true necessities . . . and did not remain long the epigoni of the whole East, burdened with their inheritance'.<sup>53</sup> In Nietzsche's symbolic language what they overcame was the stance of those 'historical men' who champion an ethics of happiness and who 'believe that the meaning of existence will become ever clearer in the course of its evolution'.<sup>54</sup> Recalling Weber's critique of 'eudaemonian' ethics and 'ethical culture', we see here the beginnings of his scathing repudiation of those 'last men who invented happiness', confronted in the pages of 'Science as a Vocation'.<sup>55</sup> For one problem in Weber's thought, as in Nietzsche's, was the 'chaos' of value and existential conflict, the probability that nothing would be clarified in the course of historical 'evolution', indeed the questioning of the Enlightenment faith that could presuppose a 'progressive' world of rosy hues and laughing voices. Surely this questioning defines a limit to Weber's neo-Kantian attachments, the point at which Nietzsche's presence can be felt.

# v

The parallel with Nietzsche is itself limited, however, by Weber's explicit political argumentation. For in the first place Weber did not doubt the long-term strength of either capitalist developmental tendencies or pressures for increasing 'democratization'. As the most political of scholars, he was therefore deeply worried about

developmental effects on class structure and leadership in the new industrial state. In some respects his orientation was shared by a select number of like-minded social scientists. For instance, Schulze-Gävernitz, the Freiburg colleague with whom Weber had collaborated in seminars on political economy, had asked how the position of labor could be strengthened in politics. Previous radical thought provided little guidance for an answer: 'Marx's great mistake', Schulze-Gävernitz had written, was to assume the emergence of 'class domination by the bourgeoisie' in Germany equivalent to that in England; but the German state instead produced 'a Junker-feudal superstructure much more than a bourgeois-liberal one'.<sup>56</sup> Given such a retrograde class structure, in comparison with England's, the most adequate *Sozialpolitik* revolved around promotion of industrialization, an alliance between working and middle classes, and certain legal reforms (e.g., freedom of association) and legislative enactments (e.g., use of state lands for resettlement in the east). We find Weber's position here too, but it is accompanied by a more radical scepticism about the probable future of labour-relations and class leadership in the new state.<sup>57</sup>

Second, in Weber's thought this scepticism assumes a theoretical form and argument. It can be summarized in the following way as a series of statements about the contradiction between 'economic' and 'political' domination: (1) In contemporary Germany political power, consolidated through the Junkers and their control of the state bureaucracy, is used to maintain the economic supremacy of the same aristocratic class. Or as Weber wrote, 'Instead of being able to base itself on a secure material foundation, political power must now be placed conversely in the service of economic interests'.<sup>58</sup> Thus, there is a kind of 'political determinism'. (2) But in the face of contemporary developmental tendencies, the real decline in the economic strength of the eastern estates will undermine and eventually destroy their assumed political jurisdictions, national power and leadership position in the state; thus, a case can be made for an 'economic determinism'. (3) Nevertheless, it is in the 'ideal interest' of all strata in society for national political power and leadership to be restructured in accordance with long-term transformations in economic strength or the 'material situation' of different classes; thus, there is a 'co-determinism' of political and economic factors. (4) And how is such restructuring to be accomplished? Short of revolution, it must come about through political initiative and education, as Weber argued in the Freiburg Address. Of course, this is an explicitly value-laden political argument and can be seen as a plea for the 'relative autonomy of politics'.

This is a remarkable pattern of reasoning, and it is scattered in its different parts throughout Weber's early writings. Nowhere is the force of the argument more obvious than in the 1897 debate with

Karl Oldenberg, a representative of the opposite view, the incurable romantic proponent of the distinctive moral achievements, solidarity and productivity of agrarian society. Oldenberg foresaw a choice between 'cosmopolitan' and adventurous export policy or a policy of autarchic agrarian development and national independence, between 'industrialization and extreme individualism' or 'agrarian civilization, the age-old master'. Embracing the latter alternative, he expounded an early version of 'dependency theory', but in defense of agrarian conservatism or the 'feudal-Junker superstructure'.<sup>59</sup> In Weber's eyes this analysis was noteworthy as a 'Philippic' against industrialization and capitalism, a mythical picture presupposing the actuality of an 'idyllic politics' of precapitalist, patriarchal solidarity.<sup>60</sup>

Weber's 'Jeremiad' contained all of the necessary and contrary elements: capitalist development, like political struggle, was 'inescapable for us' and a matter of 'our fate'; 'only the path within which it moves can be economically influenced'. In the German case attempts at resistance resulted in oddly distorted manifestations: 'bureaucratic religiosity' in the middle class, 'feudalization of bourgeois capital', a philistine politics and political environment.<sup>61</sup> In one of his most revealing perorations, Weber added,

There are optimists and pessimists in the consideration of the future of German development. Now I don't belong to the optimists. I also recognize the enormous risk which the inevitable outward economic expansion of Germany places upon us. But I consider this risk inevitable, and therefore I say, "So must you be, you will not escape from yourself."<sup>62</sup>

This is passionate and perhaps exaggerated rhetoric, to be sure, but its meaning is hardly self-evident. Given Weber's well-known, vigorous commitment to a national *Machtpolitik* of new tasks and grand horizons, a politics in the mode of Gaullist *grandeur*, so to speak, one may well wonder at the collision of identifications with 'fate', 'inevitability', 'pessimism', and 'development' against the *epigoni*. What, precisely, did Weber have in mind?

Few passages in Weber's early writings are more significant or complicated, for they are passages reverberating with the echo of ideas from Nietzsche back to Burckhardt and Goethe. Weber was prepared to go part way with Nietzsche, to side with 'pessimism' against the naive evolutionists, those 'historical men' who 'invented happiness'. But what kind of pessimism was it? In this symbolic and surprisingly differentiated language to affirm the 'risk' accompanying 'historical inevitability' was intended by Weber as a way of repudiating the 'romantic pessimism' of Oldenberg, just as Nietzsche had cast off Schopenhauer in favor of a 'pessimism of strength'.<sup>63</sup> For

Weber, however, the turn away from the literati's grey, retrospective romanticism led not to Nietzsche's Dionysian *force majeure*, but rather, as was so often the case for Weber, to the classical brilliance of Goethe's Olympian *force d'âme*. In fact the key to an understanding of Weber's stance is found in his last sentence — 'So must you be, you will not escape from yourself' — a line borrowed appropriately from the stanza on the 'Δαμῶν' in Goethe's 'Urworte. Orphische', a quotation from a famous cycle immediately recognizable to Weber's audience, and a line that introduces one of the great and problematic *leitmotifs* in Weber's thought.<sup>64</sup>

For Goethe as for Weber the 'daemon' was present as 'fate', as the characteristic and pre-formed essence of individual identity, the unchanging and self-directive 'law' of destiny. As in Greek tragedy, the individual was seen to be propelled forward according to its own internal developmental 'forms', 'stamped' on it for eternity, thus paradoxically present as both limitation and infinitude, actuality and possibility. By invoking Goethe's prophetic imagination and disclosing it within the unanticipated context of 'developmental history', Weber chose to emphasize the conjunctive formation of these paradoxes in their historical bearing: risk was accompanied by certainty, the agonistic by the necessary.<sup>65</sup> In the terms of this discussion 'fate' became symbolic for the sense in which history could be said to be constrained by 'structure', yet open to 'living' (as opposed to mechanical, stage-like) development. Put somewhat differently, if there could ever be any meaning to declaring with Marx that humans 'make their own history', for Weber it would be because 'the possible is often reached only by striving to attain the impossible that lies beyond it'.<sup>66</sup> However, on this view 'fate' and not simply 'will' governed the painfully 'indifferent' results of history.

By invoking Goethe's 'daemon' did Weber cast his lot with the forces of irrationalism and hopelessness in history? Was his a counsel of despair? The short answer is, 'I think not.' But the long answer admits that with this question we are led beyond the limits of the present study — and back to its beginnings. For Weber the 'fateful' source of pessimism lay not in cultural decadence, as Spengler believed, nor even in the 'paradox of unanticipated consequences', as Turner suggests, but rather in the deeper perspective of 'historical inevitability', in the assumption of a displacement of human action and meaning between infinite possibility and finite (im)possibility.<sup>67</sup> Weber may have adapted the thought from Goethe, but among contemporaries he shared it most closely not with Nietzsche but with Burckhardt, for like Burckhardt, Weber's pessimism was classical and 'Hellenic', if not cast in the 'heroic' or 'realistic' mold of Thucydidean politics.<sup>68</sup> 'It seems to me', Weber once wrote in comments on Burckhardt's *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*,

that the struggle of all against all in the sphere of *foreign* policy was the unalterable primary factor for the Hellenic states. (Burckhardt understands it as the outwardly-directed agon.) And I think the atmosphere that produced this condition of permanent threat to all of existence ('in the midst of life we are overtaken by death') sounds its strongest note in the specific Hellenic pessimism that Burckhardt depicts so well.<sup>69</sup>

What Weber attributed to Burckhardt could have applied with equal ease to his own position on the 'mutability of fortune', only with the qualification, as Bendix has acknowledged, that 'he did not achieve the personal serenity that Burckhardt did'.<sup>70</sup> But this was partly because for Weber's agonistic drive the aim would be 'to protect and sustain that which appears *valuable* in people — self-responsibility, the deep impulse toward achievement, toward the intellectual and moral excellence of mankind'.<sup>71</sup> Weber could say this — and continued to do so — *against* the lessons of history, *despite* the 'fate of our times'; it was, after all, the starting point for his public vocation, for his declaration that 'we individualists and partisans of democratic institutions are swimming against the stream of material constellations'.<sup>72</sup> This was a statement of purpose that could never have been uttered by Marx or Nietzsche.

The 'permanent threat to all of existence', a phrase with a peculiarly sobering effect in the nuclear age, returned in Weber's concluding reflections on modernity, now cast against the growing murmurs of 'disenchantment'. The old analogy with antiquity still prevailed: 'We live as did the ancients', Weber remarked, 'only we live in a different sense'. 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives.'<sup>73</sup> If that power cannot be fully abolished, then to recognize it and see it face to face is in itself a minor triumph, a step toward converting impossibility into possibility, and possibility into actuality.

## VI

In this paper I have sought to recover and clarify the basis for a Weberian sociology, freed from the usual systematizing ambitions of the 'theory of social action'. By considering the work before *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* I have attempted to demonstrate the sense in which we can speak of Weber's 'structuralism' and 'developmental history' in connection with his critical stance *vis-à-vis* Marx and Nietzsche, his conceptual terminology, and his overall theoretical project. Although the results achieved here cannot yet boast completion, they should assist in the effort to clear away some interpretative misunderstandings, to show what

Schluchter has characterized as the 'continuity' in Weber's work,<sup>74</sup> and to prepare the way for both a reinterpretation of Weber's contributions and a reformulation of social theory. I take it that in the present state of theoretical proliferation (and confusion) to engage at this level with Weber is to engage with theoretical issues as well. But a precise and critical demonstration of the way in which such an engagement could in fact live up to a promised rescue from our present discontents cannot be taken up in this investigation. It is a problem that lies beyond Weber before Weberian sociology.

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## NOTES

\* In revising this essay I have benefitted from thoughtful comments by Robert J. Antonio and Guenther Roth.

1. Bryan Turner, *For Weber, Essays on the Sociology of Fate*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 9; see also his earlier paper, 'The Structuralist Critique of Weber's Sociology', *Brit. J. Sociol.*, vol. 28, no. 1, March 1974, pp. 1-16.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

4. Cited in Eduard Baumgarten, *Max Weber, Werk und Person*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1964, pp. 554-5.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 554, referring to *Genesis* 2:23.

6. See Weber, 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy', *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, New York, Free Press, 1949, pp. 76-84; 'Science as a Vocation', *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford, 1946, pp. 143-7; and compare Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, New York, Vintage, 1967, p. 151, and sections 24 and 25 generally.

7. From a statement in 1909, in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1924, p. 420 (hereinafter *GASS*).

8. Carlo Antoni, *From History to*

*Sociology*, London, Merlin, 1959, ch. 4.

9. Letter to his uncle, Hermann Baumgarten, 30 September 1887, in *Jugendbriefe*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1936, pp. 270-3; Weber later reported that he had 'become approximately one-third political economist', 3 January 1891, p. 327.

10. See Naumann, 'Unsere Stellung zur Sozialdemokratie', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 7, 1893, 904-10, 938-41, 958-63.

11. See the accounts of the Weber-Göhre position in Göhre's own history, *Die Evangelisch-soziale Bewegung, Ihre Geschichte und ihre Ziele*, Leipzig, Grunow, 1896, esp. pp. 161-3; M. A. Nobbe, *Der Evangelisch-soziale Kongress und seine Gegner*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1897, pp. 23-4; Georg Wermert, *Ueber den christlichen Sozialismus und seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung*, Halle, Kaemmerer, 1897, p. 34; and Martin Rade, 'Die unfreiwillige Bedeutung des Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 11, 1897, pp. 521-4; also Weber's defence of Göhre, 'Zur Rechtfertigung Göhres', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 6, 1892, 1104-9, and his review of Naumann, 'Was heisst Christlich-Sozial?' *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 8, 1894, pp. 472-7.

12. Guenther Roth, 'The Historical Relationship to Marxism', in Bendix and Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 227-52.

13. Weber had direct knowledge of two influential studies: Karl Oldenberg, *Die Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Leipzig, Grunow, 1891; and Adolf Wagner, *Das neue Sozialdemokratische Program*, Berlin, Rehtwisch, 1892. Insight into the level of the discussions in Weber's circle can be gleaned from his report, 'Die Evangelisch-sozialen Kurse in Berlin im Herbst dieses Jahres', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 7, 1893, pp. 766-8.

14. Werner Sombart, *Das Lebenswerk von Karl Marx*, Jena, Fischer, 1909, pp. 7-9. Sombart reviewed *Capital III* in the same issue of the *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* in which Weber published 'Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers'.

15. *Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine ('theoretische') Nationalökonomie*, as discussed in Wilhelm Hennis, 'Max Webers Fragestellung', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, vol. 29, no. 3, 1982, pp. 268-70 n46, 48.

16. From Weber's Freiburg Inaugural Address, 'Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik', *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Tübingen Mohr, 2nd edn., 1958, p. 15 (hereinafter *GPS*).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

18. The most ambitious attempt is Eugène Fleischmann, 'De Weber à Nietzsche', *Archives europ. sociol.*, vol. 5, 1964, pp. 190-238, who attempts to trace a parallel shift in culture and in Weber's thought from Marx to Nietzsche, from a concern with 'economic forces' to an interest in 'cultural norms', suggesting Simmel as the intermediary. Unfortunately neither the historical evidence nor the textual evidence can support such a thesis.

19. E. W. Mayer, 'Jenseits von Gut und Böse', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 6, 1892, 685-9, who comments further,

'Today the name of this remarkably original thinker is mentioned almost daily'; also P. Schubring, 'Friedrich Nietzsche', *Die Christliche Welt*, vol. 9, 1895, 959-62, 987-90.

20. Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Künstler und der Denker*, Stuttgart, Frommann, 1897; Tönnies, *Der Nietzsche Kultus, Eine Kritik*, Leipzig, Reisland, 1897. On Riehl's relationship with Weber in Freiburg see Marianne Weber, *Max Weber, A Biography*, tr. Zohn, New York, Wiley, 1975, p. 204.

21. The developmental theme is also addressed in Wolfgang Schluchter, 'Der autoritär verfasste Kapitalismus, Max Webers Kritik am Kaiserreich', *Rationalismus der Welbeherrschung, Studien zu Max Weber*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1980, pp. 134-69.

22. Knapp, *Die Bauern-Befreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter*, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1887; and 'Die Erbbuntertänigkeit und die kapitalistische Wirtschaft', 1891, in *Die Landarbeiter in Knechtschaft und Freiheit, Gesammelte Vorträge*, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1909, pp. 45-64.

23. Lujo Brentano, 'Die Volkswirtschaft und ihre konkreten Grundbedingungen', *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 1, 1893, pp. 77-146; Weber to Brentano, 20 February 1893, in *Jugendbriefe*, op. cit., pp. 363-5.

24. 'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Altertums' (1895), in *Kleine Schriften*, Halle, Niemeyer, 1924, vol. 1, p. 83. On Weber, Meyer, Bücher and their generation's scholarship on antiquity generally see M. I. Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1981, pp. 3-23.

25. Weber, 'Referat [über "Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung"]', *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, vol. 58, 1893, p. 62.

26. Knapp, 'Referat', in *Ibid.*, p. 7.

27. Weber, *GPS*, p. 1.

28. Wolfgang Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalism, Max Weber's Developmental History* (introduction by Guenther Roth), Berkeley, University of California Press. 1981.

29. *Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland*, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1892, pp. 3-8.

30. Karl Löwith, 'Die Entzauberung der Welt durch Wissenschaft', *Merkur*, vol. 18, 1964, p. 504.

31. Fleischmann, op. cit., p. 194.

32. Paul Honigsheim, *On Max Weber*, New York, Free Press, 1968, p. 9; Engels, in Marx and Engels, *Werke*, Berlin, Dietz, 1973, p. 414; Roth, 'The Historical Relationship', op. cit., pp. 239-40.

33. For the problems of translation see Keith Tribe's note to Max Weber, 'Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers', *Economy and Society*, vol. 8, 1979, p. 203.

34. 'Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter', *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, vol. 7, 1894, p. 28, the original version of the text cited in notes 33 (a translation) and 35.

35. 'Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter', *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. 77, 1894, reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1924, p. 498 (hereinafter *GASW*). I have translated the passage rather literally (cf. Tribe, op. cit., p. 196) in order to stay as close as possible to Weber's own terminology and causal imputations.

36. See Weber's corrections to Kaerger's misinterpretation of these points in 'Entwicklungstendenzen', *Archiv*, op. cit., pp. 33-6.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 23; Weber continues by asserting that 'the migrant workers' barracks function as the money-economy's analog to the slave barracks of antiquity'.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

40. In Marx's familiar *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844), and Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, vol. II, part 2, ch. 20.

41. 'Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum', *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Jena, Fischer, 1897, p. 1 (the first version of this text on agrarian

relations in antiquity.)

42. 'Die deutschen Landarbeiter', *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, Berlin, Rehtwisch & Langewort, p. 66.

43. Shaw, *Marx's Theory of History*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 53; and Cohen's 'primacy thesis' in *Karl Marx's Theory of History, A Defence*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978, esp. p. 134.

44. See the 1910 statement in *GASS*, op. cit., p. 456.

45. 'Zur Gründung', 1896, *GPS*, op. cit., p. 26.

46. Quoted in Schluchter, *Rise of Western Rationalism*, op. cit., p. 21, from a letter of 1909.

47. See especially 'Die Erhebung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik über die Lage der Landarbeiter', *Das Land*, vol. 1, 1893, pp. 8-9, 24-6, 43-5, 58-9, 129-30, 147-8; and 'Referat [über "Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung"]', op. cit.

48. 'Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur', 1896, in *GASW*, op. cit., p. 291; imprecisely translated in Weber, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, London, NLB, 1976, pp. 389-411.

49. From Horace, *Satires*, I, i, 69-70.

50. For these quotations see Weber, *Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter*, op. cit., p. 800; 'Sozialen Gründe des Untergangs', op. cit., pp. 291, 294; 'Agrarverhältnisse', 1897, op. cit., pp. 7-10, 16.

51. Weber, *Die römische Agrargeschichte*, Stuttgart, Enke, 1891, p. 275, with the ensuing comment that 'Bebel's ideal of the proper construction of marriage' was realized de facto in the upper classes, de jure among commoners at the beginning of the Empire.

52. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. Parsons, New York, Scribner's, 1958, p. 17.

53. Nietzsche, *The Use and Abuse of History*, 1874, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1957, p. 72, from *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

55. 'Science as a Vocation', op. cit., p. 143; quoted from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part 1, sec. 5.

56. Gerhard von Schulze-Gävernitz, 'Die gegenwärtigen Mittel zur Hebung der Arbeiterklasse in Deutschland', *Ethische Kultur*, vol. 3, 1895, p. 151.

57. In this connection there is a surprising similarity between Weber's 1895 Antrittsrede and Marx's 'Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', 1844, where Marx writes, 'But every class in Germany lacks the logic, insight, courage and clarity . . . which identifies itself, if only for a moment, with the popular mind; that genius which pushes material force to political power . . .' (*The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Tucker, New York, Norton, 2nd ed., 1978, p. 63).

58. 'Entwicklungstendenzen', *Archiv*, op. cit., p. 4.

59. Karl Oldenberg, *Deutschland als Industriestaat*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1897, esp. p. 41, a speech to the annual meeting of the *Evangelisch-soziale Kongress*, followed immediately by Weber's reply.

60. Weber, '[Diskussionsbeiträge zum Vortrag Karl Oldenbergs]', in *Die Verhandlungen des 8. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1897, pp. 105, 108.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-11; because of Nietzsche's apotheosis of the 'will to power' Weber included him in the charge of 'philistinism', as noted in marginalia in Weber's copy of Simmel, *Nietzsche und Schopenhauer*: see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber, Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974, p. 261 n125.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

63. For this language see the 1886 preface to *The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism*, and *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, sec. 370, in Nietzsche's *Werke in drei Bänden*, ed. Schlechta, Munich, Hanser, 1955, vol. 1, pp. 9-10; vol. 2, pp. 244-6.

64. Goethe, *Werke*, Hamburg, Wegner, 1949, vol. 1, p. 359; Weber's memory was a bit faulty, for he rendered the relevant line, 'So musst du sein, du wirst dir nicht entrinnen', instead of 'So musst du sein, dir kannst du nicht entfliehen'. (Freud would no

doubt have exulted in the possibilities buried within this parapraxis.) The category 'das Dämonische' becomes central for Weber, as in 'Science as a Vocation' with its final appeal to the notion of each person finding and obeying 'the demon who holds the fibers of his very life'.

65. For these ideas see also Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 86-93, written in 1914 when Lukács was still under Weber's spell.

66. Weber, *Methodology*, op. cit., p. 24; Marx's line begins the second paragraph of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

67. Turner, *For Weber*, op. cit., p. 178.

68. Mommsen speaks of 'heroic pessimism' in *The Age of Bureaucracy, Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974, p. 112; and Bendix prefers 'pessimistic realism' in *Scholarship and Partisanship*, op. cit., p. 270.

69. Letter to Carl Neumann, 11 November 1900, in the Zentrales Staatsarchiv Merseburg, Nachlass Weber, 30/4, 82-3. Weber and Burckhardt shared with Nietzsche an admiration for the political 'culture of realism' from Thucydides to Machiavelli, from the *polis* to the urban *coniuratio*, but for them 'realism only meant opposition to illusions, not, as for Nietzsche, anti-idealism and immorality', in the words of Alfred von Martin, *Nietzsche und Burckhardt*, Munich, Reinhardt, 1942, p. 92. For Nietzsche's unsettled views on Burckhardt, his Basel colleague, and on Goethe, see *Werke*, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 1024-6, 1030-2.

70. Bendix, *Scholarship and Partisanship*, op. cit., p. 271.

71. Weber, 'Die deutschen Landarbeiter [Korreferat und Schlusswort]', in *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, Berlin, Rehtwisch, 1894, p. 80.

72. Weber, in *GPS*, op. cit., p. 61; cf. G. Roth and W. Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979,

pp. 201-6. The relationship Weber forms between 'individualism' and 'democracy' suggests that his political values are not to be understood simply as a species of 'aristocratic individualism' derived from Nietzsche, but instead

have sources in Protestant theology, Kant, and Goethe.

73. 'Science as a Vocation', op. cit., pp. 148-9.

74. Schluchter, *Rise of Western Rationalism*, op. cit., p. 7 n3.